

Date: Unspecified month and day in 1962
Speaker: Alwyn D. KRAMER, Captain, USN (Ret.)
Location: Lecture presented at an unspecified location
Introduction: Frank B. ROWLETT (acting as Master of Ceremonies)

Rowlett: We're very happy this morning to have with us Captain Kramer who is going to use a few minutes of your time to tell you about some of his experiences in the very early days of, shall I call it, the COMINT business? Now, a few words before he gets up here. As you know, before World War II, there were two organizations: there was a Navy organization and an Army organization. Captain Kramer was a very key member of the Navy organization and was deeply involved in the, shall I call it, production of communications intelligence. Now, he has been retired, oh, for several years and has consented to come back today to give us the benefits of some of his experiences. There's one thing I'd like to mention. Since Captain Kramer is retired and no longer on active status, he does not enjoy what we call a current clearance. Now, I think he plans to open his re...well, to close his remarks with some opportunities for you all to ask questions. I would suggest that you guide those questions to the historical era that he will cover, which will be up to about the middle of World War II. Indeed, we're happy, Captain Kramer, to have you here. And may I give you the microphone, sir? ((Long pause here.))

Kramer: I live in south Florida about as far down as you can get, halfway between Miami and the Keys. My wife and I are both New Englanders, but my wife particularly gets cold feet up in this northern climate, so we settled after retirement down in the tropics. I have an avocado and lime grove down there. We're up here at this time of the year because we're expecting our first grandchild. My son: graduate school at MIT. Last fall, 20th anniversary of Pearl Harbor, there was quite a bit published—periodic literature and one or two books, notably John Toland's *But Not in Shame*. In many of these things that appeared in the periodical and other press, there were garbled versions of things bearing on this cryptanalytical intelligence. Furthermore, I had gotten a letter about a year or so ago from this John Toland, author; and another one this winter; and other communications from some of these authors, more or less on fishing expeditions, wanting information from me. Well, I haven't answered any of these people mainly because I didn't know how much I could tell them. Ah, there's been a bad compromise of the whole enterprise, of course, with this...with the disclosures in a joint Congressional committee hearing on Pearl Harbor. And a lot of these people that intend to write about that era start off by thoroughly going over that and digesting it and take it from there. I find, however, that from, ah, just internal evidence that...for example, that John Toland's book *But Not in Shame*, it's quite clear to me

from the garbled versions and wrong attributions that he makes that he had available to him only the information that was disclosed in that joint Congressional committee hearing on Pearl Harbor. Now, one of the questions I had to ask Frank Rowlett here a couple months ago was how much additional information, besides what came out in those hearings, had been made available? So we had a conversation on our way north for a half an hour or so. And in general, little, if any, has been made available. In the course of that conversation, Mr. Rowlett—ah, we were reminiscing; we had both been on duty in those pre-Pearl Harbor days—he asked me if I would consent to talk to you people a little bit about some of those historical episodes. And I readily assented. I didn't know just when I'd be coming back. In other words, actually I'm a month later coming back than I expected to be. The doctors, Harvard Medical School, miscalculated the date by one month. ((Laughter heard.)) But finally, I'm heading back through here, and we agreed on this day's date that I'm here. One of the questions I had before I appeared before you this morning was the character of my audience. I didn't expect there to be as many as this, for one thing, and I didn't know whether it would be mostly service people or young people or a mixture or what. So he briefed me a little bit. What I propose to do is take about 15-20 minutes; give a combined biographical and historical sketch back through the era between the wars, maybe one or two episodes in there; but then open the matter for questions. And in the course of asking those questions/discussions, things of interest no doubt will come up. I entered the Naval Academy three days after graduation from high school in 1921; graduated in 1925. One of my first assignments at sea after a summer with the Navy Rifle Team was in September (19)25. The fleet, in the meantime, had gone to Australia. I missed one of the cruises that is still considered to be the criteria of Navy cruises and ports to visit, namely that Australian cruise of '25. But in any case, I joined the fleet in San Francisco. Right off the bat, I got shore patrol duty, and the sector I had to patrol was Chinatown. That was my first direct interest in anything to do with the Orient and Oriental languages. In the meantime, of course, through the Naval Academy, and the way the Japanese were acting toward China—their 21 demands at the end of the First World War; and they're generally swinging their weight around and whatnot—the whole orientation toward Japan was deteriorating. In '31, I finished up two years in Central America and a couple years on the East Coast in light cruisers. In Central America, incidentally, I did such things, attached to what was called the Special Service Squadron based in Panama, but showing the flag. It was the old armored cruiser, the *Rochester* then called. It was the...At one time, the battle cruiser...the armored cruiser *New York* at the Battle of Santiago. It was the last ship in the Navy, incidentally, that still had a wine cellar in it when I joined it in 1927. ((Laughter heard.)) It was taken out when I joined her at the Brooklyn Navy Yard in '27. ((More laughter.)) You see, Josephus Daniels in 1914 introduced Prohibition some years before it

became a national policy—that is, in the Navy. ((He chuckles.)) Ah, we were somewhat handicapped—a passing remark on that duty down there—stationed in Panama as we were—showing the flag, attending revolutions, going to the rescue in the case of epidemics and various things of that kind. But...And many foreign ships would come through Panama—including practice squadrons; Japanese, French, British, Peruvian, and so forth. A lot of stories connected with that. But we were somewhat handicapped in reciprocating wardroom entertaining between these ships. All we could offer them was coffee and Coca Cola. And, of course, we had...we looked with alacrity to visits to their wardrooms (3-4G). Well, in '31, a BUPERS letter--circular letter—called for applications for requests for Japanese language duty. They also wanted a few Chinese language officers. I applied for it and was fortunate enough to get it. From '31 to '34, I was in Japan studying Japanese, primary mission. Three of us arrived out there at the same time; a fourth that year—a little later; a Marine. We were greeted by the Naval Attaché at a little affair at his home with this policy. The Navy, incidentally, sent only bachelors to Japan. The Army had both bachelors and married people. Now, the reason why the Navy sent only bachelors: it becomes evident from this statement of policy; Captain (B% Mike) Johnson, Naval Attaché. He said he wanted results every six months. We were examined every six months in not only the language—three-year course—but on the history of Japan, the geography of the country and the Far East in general, and so forth. If we didn't produce, we'd be ordered back to the States. And one or two in the course of the year were ordered back—at the end of a year...year and a half, something like that. He did not care how we get the results. We could spend every night in a bar room if we wanted to as long as we produced results. For that reason, they sent only bachelors to Japan—the Navy did ((laughter heard))—so we wouldn't be tied down with any family obligations. Our obligations to the embassy on social functions were limited to just two or three occasions through the year, and that was the policy as far as the Navy was concerned. So we went to town studying the language. Ah, one...((Laughter heard.)) There are various aspects of that I won't go into at this point. ((More laughter.)) Returned from Japan the Fall of '34, and I got six months' indoctrination down in what we used to call "the Hole,"—a lower end of the sixth wing of the old Navy Building—to find out whether I had any facility in this thing that I...At one point in my career, I had taken a correspondence course in cryptanalysis. I apparently satisfied them because several years later, they ordered me back here. Well, I don't know how many of you are familiar with our earlier enterprise—First World War—namely Yardley's work, which was terminated the early '30s—'31 I think—with the withdrawal of funds to support the thing by the Secretary of State who felt that everything should be open and above board. That was the era of "sweetness and light," as you recall. Kellogg-Briand Pact: no...war no longer an instrument of national policy; open covenants openly arrived at

and so forth; disarmament conference by half a dozen and so forth. So this effort collapsed. But the two services, that is Army and Navy, nevertheless continued in a training program—very limited scale. By 1936, we ordered a fulltime man who had some ability in that, whose...namely is then Lieutenant Commander Safford. He was made EDO—that is Engineering Duty Only—so that he could be kept permanently in that job and not have to rotate to sea, which was necessary under the laws at the time for advancement in rank. You had to have, let's say in the rank of lieutenant commander, three years at sea before you'd be eligible for promotion to commander. This EDO category bypassed or finessed that legal necessity. In those days, we followed—I'm getting to '38 now, when I got back to Washington—we followed the movements of Mr. Yardley as a matter of interest. He disappeared for some years, and then the Canadian Government apparently had him doing some work there. The next thing we knew he was out in China. You may have seen a book—it's now in paperback post-war—*Education of a Poker Player*. Actually, the book was first published around '35—anonymous author. And the character of the book was quite different than the post-war version. He simply used the title in the post-war version. But in any case, we followed his career out in China just to keep track of him. In the meantime, the Navy was primarily oriented on Navy systems, a joint effort on diplomatic systems. The Japanese had a multiplicity of cryptographic aids. The thing that the most effort was being spent on so far as Navy was concerned...I won't speak for Army because I'm not too familiar with it except as it impinged on our work, and arrangements for a joint effort developed. The Navy was interested in their machine systems for two reasons: the Japanese diplomats were using obsolete Japanese Navy machines. The one they called the RED machine was a principle post...cryptographic aid for some years. Then, they got another system from the Japanese, the so-called PURPLE machine, which the big embassies—Paris, London, Berlin, Washington and two or three others—were equipped with. The RED machine, so-called, was confined to the Far East largely. The High Command Navy had another machine, and the Navy's interest was crack these diplomatic machines first as a running start on following their thinking on the design and development, and the cryptanalyst way of thinking on the development of these new machines. And incidentally, on that way of thinking business, this same Mike Johnson I mentioned—the Naval Attaché out there—quoted a predecessor of his about the Japanese language as a means of communication. He claimed that it was the poorest means of communication the world has ever known, and that anyone to study that language with any degree of success had to be...it helped to be somewhat (B% quacked) to undertake it. ((Laughter heard.)) Well, they say the same thing about a cryptanalyst. Now I got involved in both of these things together, so I don't know the ((more laughter))...Well, by '39, we had one of these machines. And then, eventually we got...in '40, we

got both of them running. At that time, there was no distribution of the output of this stuff except, occasionally, usually a highly paraphrased version of it to certain key individuals—usually not outside of the respective departments. The head of communications was informed; head of intelligence, Far East Section; the Chief of Naval Operations, and one of his assistants occasionally. And occasionally, a highly paraphrased version of one of these things...The Chinese situation was deteriorating continually with the Japanese pushing up the Yangtze Valley and down into south China. We felt that some of this information we were producing should be gotten to the policymakers in the State Department. So, you know, we started introducing that stuff in these paraphrased notes. As the volume of traffic became greater, we...it was decided that we'd have to set up a regular channel and consequently indoctrination of recipients. That indoctrination business became somewhat of a headache—one of the principle headaches I had, other than the technical work. I think one episode will clarify that headache on indoctrination—maybe two episodes—more than any other explanation would. We've had a very fine Secretary of the Navy, Secretary...the first Secretary of Defense, Forrestal. In those days, '39 and '40, he was sort of a special assistant initially and then an undersecretary to Frank Knox. He did not normally have access to this material. I'm speaking now of about '41. The distribution that I took care of was War Plans, Intelligence, Far East Section, the Chief of Naval Operations; plus the White House; initially the State Department. Army took care of the White House outside of the departments. Occasionally, I'd be in Mr. Knox's office showing him this stuff. I stood by oftentimes because the Japanese are...For diplomats, they're about as verbose as they come. Ten, twelve, fourteen-part messages were not at all unusual and full of references to back dispatches. So I was sort of a walking file index of these references that frequently cropped up, and at least would try to clarify some of these references that would be obscure unless you followed the stuff in detail. On more than one occasion, Mr. Forrestal stuck his head in the door and Frank Knox and called him over to look at some of these things. So I knew that Mr. Forrestal had occasional access to it. He was not one of the people, though, that had been over the period of months been given a briefing on the security factors of this whole enterprise and the delicacy of the material we're handling. A few months later—the Summer of '41...((He pauses.)) See, Mr. Forrestal rode to work in the morning with one of the Supreme Court justices. We got word via their chauffeur about a discussion that had taken place that morning between Mr. Forrestal and this Supreme Court justice about some of the stuff that was coming out of this material that Mr. Forrestal had seen and was discussing in considerable detail with this justice of the Supreme Court—and overheard by the chauffeur. Well, that's an instance of the problem...Another episode of that kind was in the White House—the Army aide, General Watson, (B% Ralph) Watson. I don't know how Colonel Bratton and the

Army people took care of the indoctrination of Mr. Watson...or General Watson, but in any case, by the Summer of '41 there had been a couple of bad security breaches there. In the first place, up to about that time, we were using paraphrased versions of this traffic, and we didn't begin putting the raw material as it came out of the translators and so forth into folders for distribution until about the late Spring of '41. But it was during this era of paraphrased versions of it that General Watson, when the White House was finished with it, tossed it in the wastebasket. Well, now, I don't know how well you people are briefed on the value of wastebasket material as a...an intelligence source of information, but even back in the era between the wars, it was a commodity of some value depending on what office building or what embassy it came out of. Wastebasket intelligence was something we used in this crypto stuff. Third Naval District, New York cased a couple office buildings—one of a Japanese Purchasing Agency. It was set up in a...sort of a quasi-legal status, largely a carryover from World War I. It was never officially approved as a setup there, but as part of the joint war effort—Allies in the First World War—they set up a purchasing mission which proceeded to burgeon and expand, and became the center for Japanese intelligence in the era between the wars. They had a staff of about, oh, a couple hundred there—including many naval officers, many technicians. They subscribed to almost every technical magazine and so forth you can imagine. They studied with considerable diligence all the contracts they were awarded, and they, by our laws, had to be announced—published. Every time a contract is awarded about something or with some concern or outfit that they weren't aware of, they would try to buy something from that same outfit themselves—always...When it came to the contract negotiation and terms of it, always with the provision that their inspectors of Navy materiel would be allowed to inspect the plant and the progress of the work in progress. So they had a very efficient organization. The Rooskies, incidentally, have taken a lot of (B% leads) from the Japanese book, and not...one of which is this thing the Japanese inaugurated here on material inspection. They have altered it, of course, in various ways; but nevertheless, they learned a good deal from the Japanese. The Japanese came up to the status as a, more or less, first-class car as the result of a broad-scale program integrated Army, Navy, the monied groups, the clans and the nobility intelligence. On most missions that came over to this country in the late part of the last century on through the First World War and even subsequently, consisted of a cross section of those respective areas and fields. And they really worked. They weren't just touring missions or junkets at all. I first came into that in the...in a [sic] era before the Japanese-Russian War. The Russians likewise in those days had missions over here, purchasing torpedoes and things like that. But they would make one or two appearances at a place that had a contract to build some torpedoes for them, but the Japanese spent every day there and had a whole delegation of people studying with great diligence. In

other words, the Japanese worked to bring their country up from the rather primitive state it was in when Perry opened it up, to the state it was in at the time of the Russia-Jap War and subsequently. And that diligence—which reminds me in many ways of the German seriousness and diligence—continued right through the era between the wars. The Japanese are reputed to be copiers. Well, it's true to some degree they are. But nevertheless, they originated many things, too. I just have to point out a couple of Nobel Prizes have been awarded for physics and medicine and whatnot in the past couple of decades. And so, they've gone far beyond the era of copying, even in those days thirty years ago. Well, in the Fall of '41, we were reading the PURPLE machines in some detail. The Japanese were beginning to make moves down into French Indochina—northern part of it, Hanoi. There's some concern with their further movements to the south. They were cooking up a scheme in Bangkok, putting pressure on Phibulsongkhram, the premier; and making moves toward moving down the southern...the bulge of French Indochina. The negotiations that had lasted all through '41, with the U.S. trying to reach some kind of *modus vivendi* to guide the China affair, was getting nowhere fast. But nevertheless, there were volumes of messages going back and forth. Nomura was sent over here in the winter—January of '41. Because of his many friends in U.S. Government circles, particularly Navy, he'd been a young Assistant Naval Attaché at the time of the Washington Arms Conference in 1922. Yardley's book goes into considerable detail on our effort at that conference. Published in '31, so they were aware of that at this time. But nevertheless, Nomura had many personal friends not only in the Navy but in the State Department, too. And if anyone was going to accomplish the mission that the Japanese military wanted to accomplish, it would be him. Well, of course, he couldn't accomplish it. It was just such a radical clash of policies that...And negotiations were kept dragging through the fall, however. At one point, one of these voluminous messages—a multi-part thing...I had just gotten back from a visit to the State Department, returning that message which Mr. Hull had seen. And I came through the front door of the old Navy Building, Constitution Avenue. And going up the center staircase, I ran into Admiral Nomura. He was...He'd just been visiting Admiral Stark—a courtesy call—on some business. Earlier that day, his secretary out at the embassy had been firing hot wires back to Tokyo wanting a better version of these garbled parts of this message. They were still...They...Admiral Nomura still didn't have that message which I had in my pouch alongside of me. ((Laughter heard.)) Incidentally, this is a...And the pouch I was using, it just happened I made...had four or five of those things made. We had a lock arrangement on the side which we then would leave a key with. After the war got underway, the method of distribution changed, and I salvaged one of these things. I still use it for some of my papers. ((Chuckling heard.)) There's a couple other instances of that kind where our cryptanalysts were able to clear these garbles long before...sometimes a day or two before

the Japanese code clerks up there at the embassy were still battling wires back and forth to Tokyo, trying to get an ungarbled version of it so they could run it through their machine. We didn't offer to help them, of course. ((Laughter heard.)) But, ah, regarding compromise, we had one or two scares. If you recall, in '41, Germany declared war on Russia. The Japanese had sent to Berlin a General Oshima as ambassador. General Oshima had access not only to the Foreign Office—Ribbentrop and his people—but also the General Staff. And he was equipped not only with the PURPLE machine, the most secure—from their point of view—cryptographic aid, but also a special code which he would put his information into, which would then be fed into the machine so that the Foreign Office could only generate this encoded message which, in turn, would be passed on to the General Staff. Our cryptanalysts broke that code, of course. So reading that, and we were getting some valuable information on that circuit—the Berlin-Tokyo circuit—because of that source, General Oshima. At one point—and this was in late Summer of '41—Ribbentrop in an interview with Oshima told him that the Americans were reading some of the Japanese systems. Well, we were concerned. Actually, we were reading the two machines. There were several area codes: North and South America, the European area code, the Far Eastern area code, and then, I believe, a fourth one of administrative character or for special missions. We concentrated...In the meantime, I should mention this further background on the mechanics administrative-wise of the joint Army-Navy effort. When it got to the point where we were reading a number of these systems...And let me go back even a little farther. When there are a number of systems that we weren't reading, my general understanding is that either the Army cryptanalysts or the Navy would undertake prime responsibility for a given system. When a system was organized in a position for (B% either) code recovery (B% are) readable if it's cipher, then both units were given the system. And it got to the point where while we're reading several of them, the volume of traffic became a problem. So there was an administrative...an administrative split of the effort on readable systems. I believe Army had even days; Navy odd days. Well, sometimes a multi-part message would be a one-day system and sometimes go over the next day. That Saturday night—night before Pearl Harbor—it happened to be that way, too. That one-part came in a one-day system, and...((He clears his throat.)) Well, with that background—our joint effort—this business of compromise was of some concern. But then, Tokyo had sent some months before an inspector—sort of an Inspector General of the Army sort of thing for their (B% “giam-sho”), Foreign Office, circulating around North America and then later on through South America, to inspect security features of their different establishments: their Consulate General in Tokyo...I mean, in New York, San Francisco, a more or less cursory one of the embassy, of course. He didn't have high enough rank to swing any weight in there. But they made various suggestions which we followed in some detail on tightening up

security. They inaugurated a 24-hour watch overnight at the Consulate General in New York. A man armed with a gun complicated some of our gumshoe enterprises up that way. They apparently consulted this inspector. And their cryptanalysts and whatnot finally decided in Tokyo, after mulling this thing over for some weeks, that it was one or two of the rather minor systems used mainly for administrative purposes that had been compromised. They didn't change it. And fortunately, they were so certain of the security of their area codes, which they were changing by that time about every six months, and of their machines, which they had full confidence in, that they made no effort to change those things at all. But nevertheless, the cryptanalysts and the people in this work were somewhat concerned at the time. And it was for that reason that—and with such material as that—that we were able to drive home the point to some of these recipients on the delicacy of this enterprise we're in—the fact that the whole source might dry up if there were a compromise. And this Forrestal conversation, this wastebasket episode of General Watson and so forth, were all also labeled as cases in point of the sort of things that couldn't be tolerated in this kind of undertaking. I've been talking quite a while here. I think if you people have any questions, we might open up the matter for questions or discussion—whatever you say. I can keep on talking, but, ah, any questions? ((A pause here.)) Yeah.

Campaigne: Al, Howard Campaigne. I...

Kramer: Yes, of course! How is the game of (B% Go) these days? ((He chuckles.))

Campaigne: Ah...I wonder if you could say a little more about what happened in the period from, let's say, the 5th of December to the 10th of December in 1941.

Kramer: On what?

Campaigne: In 1941. The...(B% I mean,) from the 5th to the 10th of December—the most critical days in (2-3G). ((Very faint audio.))

Kramer: I presume you're referring primarily to that Saturday night of the 6th and Sunday morning of the 7th because I would say roughly that the 8th, 9th, and 10th, we're all in somewhat of a state of shock. ((Chuckling heard.)) Saturday afternoon, the 6th...((He pauses.)) Perhaps I better precede that with a little background into the previous month. An Imperial conference which through the years had been called rather infrequently by the Japanese—it's a conference of the General Staff both Army and Navy, and the Foreign Minister and the cabinet before...in the presence of the Emperor; high national policy, if there were...is any such thing—had been called in November. We knew there's something serious cooking. Furthermore, in a somewhat carefully worded dispatch from the (B% "giam-sho") Tokyo to Berlin from General Oshima, there's a reference made to 26th of November, which happened to be a deadline date in this business of negotiations being carried on between General...Admiral

Oshi...Nomura and Secretary Hull—U.S.-Japanese negotiations on the China...French Indochina affair. This Japanese message to General Oshima for passing on privately...confidentially to the General Staff primarily and maybe to Ribbentrop or to Hitler was that unless some *modus vivendi* were reached with the U.S. by the 26th of November, things were automatically going to happen. There's no indications except our observation of the Asiatic Fleet and general intelligence on what those things were. In other words, this is another feature in which we have to keep indoctrinating and warning our recipients of this crypto-intelligence (1G). The fact that it must necessarily be a limited segment of the whole intelligence pie; and they can easily be misled by this cryptanalytical intelligence if they place too much weight on it and didn't fit it into the broad intelligence picture. This is a case in point: something is going to happen. What, we didn't know. It looked pretty certain that they were planning to move to south French Indochina. Furthermore, we'd been following in some detail a scheme being cooked up between the Japanese ambassador in Bangkok and the Army Chief of Staff there. It was a scheme intended to force the hand of the premier of Burma [sic], Phibulsongkhram. ((TR NOTE: Phibulsongkhram was the Prime Minister of Thailand at that time.)) He had made policy statements on a number of occasions through the war...through the fall, rather, that he was going to remain neutral. That term sounds familiar these days, but neutral as regards the British and Japanese. The first country that invaded his boundaries, whether British or Japanese, he would fight them and become allies of the other side. Well, this whole scheme was cooked up apparently—the Japanese ambassador, Army Chief of Staff—to force (B% Phibul...)’s hand. The idea was that Kota Bahru on the Malay Isthmus...Kota Bahru was in British territory—British Malay. But the boundary line goes kitty-corner. The peninsula comes down this way; the boundary line that goes at an angle like that, Kota Bahru is right at the point of that...It goes up the east coast a little bit. A landing was to be made just south of Kota Bahru, forcing the British garrison back inland into Thai territory. That would force (B% Phibul...) to declare war on the British because the British had invaded. And that was the general scheme. There'd been no approval as such of that thing indicated from Tokyo, but we knew these things had been cooked up for a long time. We had watched the buildup of transports, fleet and whatnot in northern French Indochina—Hanoi area—as well as Formosa. We knew that something was cooking. We fully expected they might make a move toward the Dutch—British and Dutch, the French, all occupied with the war in Europe and whatnot. Ah, personally, this is an aside of...I want to label as such—a personal opinion. It's not Monday morning quarterbacking either. I've expressed this a number of times both through the war and subsequently that if the Japanese at that point had bypassed Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, and hit the preoccupied British, Dutch and French, we might still be debating—I was using this phraseology in '46 to '48—on

the floor of the Congress whether to go to war with the Japanese or not. That's one of those iffy sorts of Monday morning quarterback statements. I (B% wouldn't) necessarily label it as such. But nevertheless, that was the way I felt about it at the time. Nomura tried strenuously to convince Tokyo that there was a losing proposition to undertake anything other than some sort of a *modus vivendi* with the U.S., but he couldn't convince the dominating Army faction, Imperial Headquarters in Japan. Navy was skeptical about some of these things, except for one man Yamamoto, who cooked up this whole Pearl Harbor enterprise. Well, with that as background, I'll come now to 6th of December. We knew since we had given the Japanese ambassador a note setting forth our terms for a *modus vivendi*, after consultation with the British, Dutch and so forth, around the 26th of November. It was about the time of this deadline incidentally. Whether Mr. Hull picked that date specifically for that reason, I don't know. Here...In any case, we were momentarily from the 26th on, from the time of this note, expecting some kind of a response from Tokyo. In the meantime, other things were happening the end of November and early December, including this movement of the convoy, destruction of codes, the 3rd and the 4th—all except one machine here in Washington; and various things like that. So the whole thing was building up to something as it approached the 6th, this convoy moving south. And it had gotten to the point where it was beginning to round the bulge of French Indochina. It could head for either Kota Bahru or Bangkok area or both. It looked as though it was going to carry through this scheme that had been cooked up weeks before in Bangkok. On the morning of the 6th, still nothing on a reply. Early afternoon, Saturday afternoon, I was about to secure when I checked with the GY people—the cryptanalysts and so forth—on whether anything on the Tokyo-Washington circuit were in. One message came in. It turned out, after running it through the machine, eighth part of a 14-part message. Well, with that, I stayed on with a couple of assistants; and we proceeded to work on the things as they kept cropping up. By eight o'clock that night, we had thirteen of the fourteenth part...of the fourteen parts. And about that time, another separate message indicating that the fourteenth part would be sent in a little bit later with special instructions also in a separate message on delivery. Well, distribution was made that night. And my usual fashion, before starting off from Navy Department, I would do some telephoning first to find out the location of my recipients. At that time, I had responsibility for the White House, usually through the naval aide. Army was taking care of the State Department outside of the two departments. So I phoned the naval aide, and it turned out that he was over at Admiral Wilkinson's home in Arlington. And General Miles was over there—head of G2—also. So I got three birds with one stone over there. On the instructions of Captain ((John)) Beardall, the naval aide ((to President Franklin Roosevelt)), I left a pouch...locked pouch with a young Situation Room officer that Captain Beardall had set up in the Fall of '41 in the White House. Situation Room

intended as such: a map room to follow the war in Europe as well as to receive a highly classified thing and maintain proper security on it. This... A staff of young Army and Navy officers and one senior assistant had responsibility for that Situation Room. In any case, by 9 o'clock that night, the President got it. This young duty officer had preemptory instructions passed on from Captain Beardall to get it to Mr. Roosevelt at once. My concern on my way over there was that Mr. Roosevelt might be at...entertaining, some dinner party, and this young second lieutenant would hesitate to break into a party with a lot of brass and whatnot. And so, I gave him rather preemptory instructions that he was to get it to Mr. Roosevelt at once. Well, it happened that he was not entertaining; Mrs. Roosevelt was. So Mr. Hopkins and Mr. Roosevelt saw it by a little after 9. Then I went on to Secretary Knox's apartment up on Connecticut Avenue. And an hour or so later, I got over to Admiral Wilkinson's home across the river where Captain Beardall and General Miles also saw the thing. When Mr. Knox read the stuff—an aside—and he told me that the next morning at 9...at 10 o'clock there was to be a meeting at the State Department—Mr. Stimson, Mr. Hull, and himself, and one or two others discussing various things. He didn't say what. He wanted me to be there with that message, and anything further that came in through the night, at 10 o'clock. And so, I was. Early the next morning, that 14th part had come in, together with one or two other messages not particularly pertinent. I was up at the State Department at 10 o'clock with the material for Mr. Hull...ah, for Frank Knox rather; Army was delivering to Mr. Hull; and also (B% left it off) at the White House. When I got back to the department, Constitution Avenue, about 10:20 or so, this thing that's been blown up so much in the Congressional hearing on Pearl Harbor, this 1 o'clock delivery message, was there: instructions that...or that...rather positive and preemptory that the delivery to Secretary Hull was to be made at 1 o'clock Washington time. Well, there was a couple other messages on further destruction of (B% code) and whatnot. Within ten minutes, in any case, I had those in folders and got the material up to General...Admiral Stark's office. Commander McCollum was in there with some of the earlier material at the time. And headed over to the State Department trying to catch Secretary Knox before that meeting broke up. I got over there all right. The meeting was still going on. While I was there, a Colonel Bratton, the Army opposite number of mine, was over there with material for Secretary Hull as well as Secretary Stimson. We sent in these folders via personal secretaries to the Secretary of State, and waited outside while they looked them over. It was during the course of that lull, we were horsing around and various things, reminiscing. I had had duty in Pearl Harbor in '36 to '38—destroyers. Pearl Harbor then, and still does, keep somewhat unusual time. It's not a regular time zone, not an even number, but (B% it's) Zone ten and a half, we used to call it. They use letters nowadays. So that made it 7:30 Sunday morning at Pearl Harbor, at 1 o'clock Washington time, for delivery. In the course of conversation, I

mentioned that fact that it was about the quietest time of the week for the fleet in Pearl Harbor there. But that thing has been blown out of proportion in subsequent writers' minds as something that was known—that just the mention of Pearl Harbor in connection with this crypto-intelligence—they've exaggerated the association. It was just a passing remark, in other words. I don't know how much more you want to know about it, Howie. Those are the main essentials of the thing. Any other questions? Or do you want me to expand on it a little more?

Campaigne: (B% That's fine.) ((Very faint audio.))

Kramer: (B% Okay?) I might...I have touched on some of this waste paper business as one of the valuable articles of intelligence activities. In fact, it's a commodity that has a price value. Waste baskets from certain office buildings are worth so much, and this applies around the world. It's been going on for decades. The Japanese learned, not only in their Consulate General but their...their Purchasing Mission agent up there in New York, they didn't burn; it was against building regulations in most of the buildings they were in. But they got one of these things that chewed up the stuff so that...so we didn't get much out of those places, oh, from I...I would say '39 on, maybe '40 on. We had some indications though which helped us on a Japanese naval ship movement code. And in the Spring or Winter of '40-'41, a new distribution...a new code via diplomatic courier was being made. Late in the spring, when I knew that delivery had been made, I set up a golf match. We had two courses up in Manhattan Island. One was the northern course and other was the southern course. The northern course was the Consulate General's Office; the southern course was the Purchasing Mission. I arranged for a golf match to be set up the weekend—northern course. They took it from there and proceeded to set the thing up. It consisted of having everyone in the building from the owners down through the janitor—usually a college man—two or three people on the janitorial staff including one or two elevator operators; our own 3rd Naval District experts; a safe man...a safe expert; a lock expert—and those people were dandy. I haven't seen a safe or lock yet that couldn't stop them for more than about 20 minutes or so. It took quite a bit of setting up to arrange one of these golf matches, in other words. The main purpose of this particular one was to acquire that new naval ship movement code. We got the picture—mission accomplished. But then, about three months later—just about the time it was to be put into effect; in fact, just a few weeks after it was put into effect—an enterprising, younger intelligence officer out in San Francisco...It was a fairly common practice in those days—I might give this little background—for district intelligence officers or one of the junior officers to board Japanese ships with the Customs and Narcotics people and so forth, in their uniforms as a rule. But the prime interest of the Navy was to study the ships for gun emplacements: whether bulkheads and so forth were strengthened so that guns could be mounted on deck and that sort of thing; convertibility for war purposes. On this particular inspection out in San Francisco, they

came across some codebooks which the captain of the ship had in a sack...a hemp sack. They took custody of this thing ostensibly to inspect for narcotics, or customs—illegal books that weren't allowed in the country; something like that. They kept custody of this thing for not over three hours—something like that. And then they returned the stuff to them and then thought they'd done a good job. In the meantime, they'd run this stuff through some high-speed photography. And a couple days later, they sent a couple of couriers across the country, hightailing by plane, with this loot. Well, I kept cooling my heels for a few hours through the day. Didn't know just how to approach it. But it just happened that that morning, a brief message...one-sentence message had come in from Tokyo canceling that system. So I just had to show them that. That was the end result of their over-industrious enterprise out there. As a result of that, rather preemptory instructions were again circulated, emphasizing previous instructions already in effect from Operations to all Naval Districts to lay off of anything having to do with codes and ciphers. In other words, even our own Armed Services are not in general familiar with the delicacy of this material we're handling. Nowadays, when the whole enterprise has burgeoned as much as it has, I imagine you have some real headaches in this. I don't know too much about the current situation, except what I read in the newspapers, like Will Rogers. But any other questions?

U/I Male: I was wondering, Captain, ah, I read in the papers that Hull...And the gist of it is that Hull did not meet Nomura at 1. Did (B% Nomura)...?

Kramer: No.

U/I Male: Did (1-2G) have something to do with that, or was this, ah, something that...?

Kramer: No, no. I think that probably...I don't know. This is just guessing. That conference—it was taking place from 10 o'clock on—apparently lasted 'til about noontime, and my guess is that Mr. Hull simply went home to lunch. Mr. Wells, Sumner Wells, was on duty there; and Hornbeck, I think, was around the department then, too—Special Advisor on Far East affairs. And I think they purposely didn't send for Mr. Hull when this 1 o'clock business came in, but Sumner Wells (B% was prepared). I think Mr. Hull arrived a little later. I mean, they purposely didn't plan to meet him at 1 o'clock. They stalled it until about 2 when Mr. Hull finally got there and laid it on thick. Yes?

U/I Voice: (B% Sir, what...?) ((TR NOTE: Audio apparently cuts out here.))

Kramer: In general, my...The answer is I don't know, and I don't believe anyone else knew particularly. If the Canadians wanted to hire him and could get some good out of him, fine. And Mr. Hull had visited, as he indicates in his book, the British activity after the First World War. He got nowhere and he got the royal runaround in France, shunted from one office to the other. And he knew that there was some effort being made up in Canada, but nothing indicated in the book. And we knew just from general

information that there was some effort being made in Canada. Just how successful it was and how broad it was, I didn't know; and I don't believe anyone in our departments did. If Mr. Yardley could do them some good, fine. A little later, apparently there was a contract for a certain length of time because a little later, he was hired on a somewhat similar basis by Chiang Kai-shek to work on Japanese Army codes in this movement through China—field codes. Apparently did them some good, judging from his subsequent book, (B% *Conventions*) of a...I mean, *Education of a Poker Player*. Does that answer your question?

U/I Voice: Yes.

U/I Female: Sir, I would like to ask you about a (B% famous) statement (2-3G) Red Book (2-3G). ((Very weak audio.))

Kramer: Well, the only book that I know of that Zacharias wrote was one, now in a paperback, called *Secret Missions*. It came out around '46.

U/I Female: That's the one.

Kramer: Yeah. I had known Zacharias many years. He was sort of a dean of Navy Language Officers; the first one post-war—there had been one previous to the First World War. I have, and had—he's dead now—a high admiration for Zacharias' ability as an intelligence officer. Like any statement of that kind, though, there's always exceptions. I think that as a general characteristic, that is probably true. I think you'll find that documented—documented is not quite the right word—but substantiated frequently during the war fighting on these islands and whatnot. Our troops were encouraged to exercise initiative, intelligence, imagination; and operate on their own. The Japanese were indoctrinated to follow the book. If the situation didn't follow the book, they got slaughtered frequently. So I would say, in reply to your question, that as a general characteristic, that is probably true, but there are always exceptions. Anyone else?
((TR NOTE: Some audio probably missing here.))

Rowlett: Captain Kramer, I'm sure from the response that you've just received here that this is the best indication of our appreciation for the time you've spent with us. We're indeed grateful to you, sir. Thank you very much. ((TR NOTE: Audio ends at this point.))

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