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WASHINGTON

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2 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

Attention: Mr. William Friedman

SUBJECT: Report of the Tripartite (US-UK-French) Security Working Group

Herewith three complete copies of the subject Report which have reached this office in their final form just recently.

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FOR THE DIRECTOR, SPECIAL PROJECTS STAFF:

Robert F. Packard
Robert F. Packard

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REPORT

of the

TRIPARTITE SECURITY WORKING GROUP
United States - United Kingdom - France

on the
Implementation of Agreed Principles
and Standards of Security

Paris

December 8, 1952

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PART I

INTRODUCTION

On 4 June 1951, the Tripartite Security Working Group, composed of representatives of the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, approved a report for submission to their respective governments for consideration. Part IV of this report set forth certain fundamental principles and standards of security for incorporation into the security system of each government. The preparation of this report followed a comparative study of the regulations and methods of safeguarding classified matter then in use in the three countries.

The Tripartite Report made the following recommendations to each of the three Governments:

- "(a) The acceptance of the Principles and Standards set forth in this Report.
- (b) The notification, as soon as possible, to the other two Governments of its views on such Principles and Standards.
- (c) The implementation of the accepted Principles and Standards as rapidly and completely as possible.
- (d) Regular meetings of representatives from the three countries to observe the application of accepted Principles and Standards.
- (e) The maintenance of the contacts established through these meetings for the purpose of exchanging information on security systems and problems."

Recommendations (a) and (b) were implemented when acceptance of the Principles and Standards of the Tripartite Report was completed through an exchange of notes among the three Governments.

Fursuant to Recommendation (d), arrangements were made in August 1952 among the three Governments to hold further meetings of the Tripartite Group. It was agreed that the following objectives should be pursued:

- (a) To hear statements of the implementation of the accepted Principles and Standards.
- (b) To report upon progress made in the means employed to

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safeguard classified information following a re-examination of the physical security methods and the effects of screening procedures, in the establishments previously visited; and

- (c) To extend the examinations to include certain other establishments in the civilian administration of government and in industry not previously visited.
- (d) In the light of (b) above, to review as appropriate the Principles and Standards of the Tripartite Report of 4 June 1951, and to make recommendations with respect thereto.

The 1952 meetings were held successively in Washington, London and Paris, during which the three Governments described the systems in use for personnel security and protection of classified documents in government and related industries, with emphasis given to the steps taken by each Government since June 1951 to implement the agreed Principles and Standards. The United States program was presented at Washington from 27 October through 31 October, the British program in London from 12 November through 18 November, and the French program in Paris from 21 November through 28 November. Following the study of the French security system, the Tripartite Group met in Paris to prepare this Report.

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PART II

SUMMARY OF PRESENTATIONSA. UNITED STATES

An exposition was given of the constitutional and legal basis for security practices and their application consistent with the principles of democratic government. The overall organization for security within the United States Government was described. The Presidential Executive Order No. 10290, which established uniform standards for the classification, handling and transmission of classified security information, was explained. Mention was also made of a pending Executive Order which, when signed, would establish uniform minimum standards for the investigation and clearance of civilian and military personnel who require access to classified security information. Correlation and utilization of subversive information in the United States Government was outlined in detail, and the investigative techniques and procedures involved in background and loyalty investigations demonstrated and explained. A detailed briefing was given of the Loyalty Program established under Executive Order No. 9835 with respect to the screening of all civilian applicants and incumbents employed by the Federal Government. Also described were the suspension and removal procedures under Executive Order No. 9835 and Public Law No. 733. Furthermore, procedures for the removal of military personnel for loyalty or security reasons were explained.

Visits and inspections were made of both a civilian and military security agency. The programs for the evaluation and protection of non-government installations and for port and ship security were outlined. An aircraft plant and an electronics plant were visited. Explanations were given of the security measures in these plants, followed by tours of inspection. A presentation was made concerning the physical security of government buildings at home and abroad, including an exhibit and description of security equipment and technical aids.

A briefing was offered concerning the history, organization, strength and activities of the Communist Party, U.S.A., and the counter-

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measures and prosecutive action taken.

In conclusion, a summation was made of U.S. security practices and their relationship to the Principles and Standards agreed to in the Tripartite Security Working Group report of 4 June 1951. A copy of the United States program is attached as Appendix A.

B. UNITED KINGDOM

The United Kingdom program included presentations by H.M. Treasury, Ministry of Defence, War Office, Foreign Office, Security Service, Royal Air Force. Visits of inspection were made to the R.A.F. Establishment, Benson, the Gloster Aircraft Company, (G.A.C.), Gloucester, the Bristol Aircraft Factory, (B.A.C.), Bristol, and the War Office Registry.

The subjects covered in the presentations included the general Principles and Standards of Personnel and Physical Security as applied in Government Departments and in industry engaged on classified defence work; the implementation of the Royal Air Force security regulations at unit level; the use of police dogs as an aid to the protection of material within large sensitive areas where sufficient man-power or perimeter fencing cannot be applied; the implementation of standing security instructions in the methods employed in industry to safeguard classified documents and material; security education by films; the security of economic information; the security of military personnel and control of suspects. A copy of the United Kingdom program is attached as Appendix B.

C. FRANCE

The French Delegation emphasized the considerable scope of two inter-ministerial decisions made since the first meeting of the Tripartite Committee:

1. The creation by a decree of January 3, 1952, of a Permanent Inter-Ministerial Committee for Security, competent to deal with all problems concerning the protection of secrecy in all Ministerial Departments.
2. The extension, for the benefit of the NATO powers, of the articles of the Penal Code concerning crimes and offenses against the external security of the State (Decree of July 11, 1952).

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The first regulation creates the inter-ministerial coordination which is indispensable for security matters, and thus permits the establishment of security standards common to all the Ministries.

Consequences on the national level of the January 3, 1952, decree are as follows:

1. The establishment by the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Security, and circulation by the Permanent Secretariat for National Defense (SGPDN, an agency of the Presidency of the Council) of an inter-ministerial order concerning the protection of secrecy. This order provides for the adoption of common standards which will form the basis for the establishment in each Department of special rules adapted to the needs of each administration.

2. Establishment and circulation, under the same conditions, of an order concerning the protection of secrecy in private firms working for the National Defense.

3. An order concerning the protection of secrecy in State establishments is under consideration. Attention should be called to the fact that establishments depending on the Ministry of National Defense are already provided with rules issued by this Ministry.

4. On a much smaller scale, an inter-ministerial decree was signed on November 29, 1952, defining the scope of the missions of the Naval Section of the Security Service of the Armed Forces in case of siege or war.

Handling of Classified Material

No law exists in France authorizing the dismissal because of political opinions of a military officer, a civil servant (governed by the Civil Service Statute), an employee or a workman (governed by the collective agreements of his profession). However, a letter from the President of the Council (Letter No. 261, January 3, 1952) prescribed:

1. That all existing regulations be exploited to eliminate anti-national or subversive civil servants or employees.
2. That, in any case, such individuals who cannot be eliminated should be removed from posts of confidence: i.e., involving access to classified matter.

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The responsibility for maintaining, transferring or dismissing an individual rests with the Minister concerned; an opinion, favorable or unfavorable, is given by the Security Service of the Armed Forces (through the channels of the SGPDN in the case of a civil servant). The French Delegation also explained in detail the ways and means employed by the Armed Forces Security Service (SSFA) regarding the screening procedure, as well as its relations with the Renseignement Generaux, Surveillance du Territoire, Gendarmerie, etc.

A visit to the Sureté Nationale was arranged, and a lecture was given on the French Communist Party. Principles of industrial security were discussed in detail, and were demonstrated (a) in organizations depending on the State (visit to ONERA, the Bretigny test flight field, to DEFA), and (b) in private firms (Hispano factory). Educational films on security were shown.

A copy of the French program is attached as Appendix C.

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PART III

IMPLEMENTATION BY THE THREE GOVERNMENTS
OF "PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS" OF SECURITY

A. UNITED STATES

The United States has continued to carry out its security and loyalty programs in effect as of the date of approval of the Tripartite Report. The Inter-Departmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) and the Inter-Departmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) of the National Security Council (NSC) have continued to study, coordinate, and make recommendations covering the many problems affecting the internal security of the United States. There are, however, certain specific measures taken by the United States Government in implementation of the "Principles and Standards" and these are described below.

1. Executive Order No. 10290 was signed by the President of the United States on September 24, 1951, and became effective in all Departments and agencies concerned on October 24, 1951. This Executive Order prescribes regulations establishing minimum standards for the classification, transmission and handling by Departments and agencies concerned of official information which requires safeguarding in the interest of the security of the United States. Such regulations are designed to achieve uniformity in the safeguarding of official information.

2. A Presidential directive was forwarded to all interested Departments and agencies, requiring them to coordinate with other interested Departments and agencies prior to issuance of releases or statements to the press. These instructions provide a safeguard against inadvertent disclosures of information by one Department or agency consisting of or concerning classified information of another Department or agency.

3. On July 14, 1951, the President required the National Security Council to make an investigation of the administration of Federal employee security programs. Pursuant to that request, the study and report were made by the Inter-Departmental Committee on Internal Security, assisted by the Civil Service Commission, and submitted April 29, 1952. On August 8, 1952, the President directed all Executive Departments and agencies to cooperate fully with the Civil

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Service Commission in preparing a plan to combine the three existing programs into one. Each Department and agency having an employee security program was requested to give careful study to the report of the Inter-Departmental Committee and to re-examine its own program in the light of that report.

4. The "Magnuson Act", which authorizes a port and ship security program has been enacted by the Congress. The United States Coast Guard is implementing the law which includes the screening and requiring of passes for all United States seamen and dock workers.

5. Investigations. On April 5, 1952, by law, the responsibility for personnel background investigations in certain sensitive agencies and Departments was transferred from the Federal Bureau of Investigation to the Civil Service Commission. The agencies and Departments involved may still refer to the Federal Bureau of Investigation such investigations involving top sensitive positions. Also in any instance where subversive or disloyal data is discovered concerning the person being investigated, the investigation must be immediately turned over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The relieving of the FBI of these investigations has permitted it to utilize additional personnel on investigations of espionage, sabotage and subversion. The Civil Service Commission has obtained and trained additional investigators to handle its responsibilities, thereby adding to the security forces of the United States Government.

6. Executive Order No. 10241. This Executive Order amends Executive Order No. 9835, entitled "Prescribing Procedures for the Administration of an Employees' Loyalty Program in the Executive Branch of the Government". It provided that the standard for the refusal of employment or the removal from employment in an Executive Department or agency on grounds relating to loyalty shall be that, on all evidence, there is reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the person involved to the Government of the United States. Prior thereto the standard for the refusal of employment or the removal from employment in an Executive Department or agency on grounds relating to loyalty was that on all the evidence reasonable grounds existed for belief that the person involved was disloyal to the Government of the United States. This amendment has changed the standard for the removal of

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persons

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persons whose loyalty is in question and has thereby improved the effectiveness of the loyalty program.

7. Public Law No. 414. This Public Law includes a restatement of United States immigration laws governing admission of aliens to the United States, and strengthens the security provisions of those laws.

8. Executive Order (pending publication). A draft Executive Order has been submitted to the Office of the President for approval. This Executive Order will prescribe regulations establishing minimum standards for security investigation and clearance for access to classified security information in the Executive Departments and agencies of the United States Government. The purposes of these minimum standards are: (1) to establish the policy and general procedure relating to personnel security investigations and the clearance of personnel within the Executive Departments and agencies of the United States who, by reason of their assignment or employment, require access to classified security information; (2) to define and establish minimum standards of investigation and criteria upon which clearances may be granted; and (3) to effect general uniformity in the field of personnel security investigations and clearances throughout the Executive Departments and agencies, so that the interchange of information within the Government pertaining to completed personnel security investigations and granted clearances may be facilitated.

9. Industrial Security. Two industrial security boards have been established. The Industrial Evaluation Board selects the vital installations and industries which should receive security protection, and the Facilities Protection Board is responsible for establishing a program to provide security protection to these installations. The two boards are currently engaged in carrying out this program.

B. UNITED KINGDOM

Personnel Security

Screening of Personnel.

The U.K. Government has, by its acceptance of the first report, committed itself to the vetting against Security Service records of

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all persons whose duties require access to matters classified higher than RESTRICTED. This has greatly extended the area of vetting and it is currently taking place at a rate which is approximately one-third greater than that applying at the time of the first meeting of the Working Group.

A "Positive Vetting" procedure has been introduced in the Civil Service and three fighting Services as an additional precaution for the most vital posts, since the Tripartite Report of 1951. It is complementary to basic security vetting. The persons included in the new procedure are those who have access to the whole of a plan, policy, project or equipment, or to an important part of a plan, policy, project or equipment, the security of which is vital to the national defence.

All departments work to this common formula when deciding which persons are to be positively vetted; a common standard is thereby achieved.

This system has set up a new principle in the U.K. by making the candidate play a part in his own security clearance. Its central feature of a questionnaire to be completed by occupants of, and candidates for, key posts is part of a procedure which consists of the careful taking up of references on standard forms, departmental enquiries and, where considered necessary, field investigations.

The department concerned writes to the two referees named by the incumbent in or candidate for a vital post. In the case of established officers, the reports and references available in the Civil Service Commission are consulted. These normally include medical reports, school and college reports, at least two and usually several private references and testimonials from former employers. All official records of a candidate are carefully scrutinized; these include the confidential reports furnished at regular intervals by superior officers, which are now rendered on a more detailed and standardised form. Special attention is now given to any reference to a weakness in character in a report.

In a minority of cases where requisite information is not obtainable by other means, or because it is considered necessary for some other reason, field enquiries are made.

The positive

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The "positive vetting" procedure is open and thus may encourage members of the public to volunteer information which they would not have disclosed in the past.

Supervision of Staff.

The "positive vetting" instructions issued in March and September, 1952, have laid a special responsibility on Department heads to know about the attitudes and habits of their staff in key posts.

"Need to Know."

The Chairman of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Security wrote to all departments stressing the need for this principle to be applied to the distribution of the more highly graded papers; the Cabinet Office and Ministry of Defence, in which the majority of such papers originate, were particularly urged to review their distribution of papers.

Standardisation of Reference Questionnaires.

The Inter-Departmental Committee on Security has standardised more comprehensive forms of reference questionnaires. These forms will be sent to personal referees, previous employers, and any such other persons as are likely to be profitable sources of information, in respect of new intake into Government Departments.

Records of Personnel Clearance.

The Inter-Departmental Committee on Security has called upon all departments to maintain records of vetting clearances.

Security Instruction of Personnel.

During the past year an increasing amount of time has been devoted to security instruction in departments, including the production of films.

Industrial Security

General Concept. Instructions have been issued to industrial undertakings by the Ministry of Supply in connection with the handling of classified material.

In addition to the classification of a contract, detailed guidance as to the secret aspects of the material and (where practicable) as to its handling is now given to the Contractor by the Ministry of Supply. Efforts by Government Departments are now being made to spot-

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light projects of special operational importance so that security resources can be concentrated where they are most required.

Security of Classified Contracts. The Security Service has extended its advice to include factories engaged on Confidential Contracts (in addition to those graded higher), and all main sub-contractors are under security supervision.

The Security Service has extended its advice to Universities, Insurance Agents and Patent Agents, besides other civil agencies indirectly and even remotely concerned with Defence projects.

Security Training. Security films have been prepared and will be shown in factories.

Security advice continues to be extended to undertakings not in receipt of classified contracts but of potential importance in war.

Sabotage. Security advice on sabotage has been extended to public utility services and factories.

Protection of Information on Key Points

During the period under review, the following additional measures have been taken to restrict the publication of air photographs which might be of value to an enemy in targetting:

- (a) The "Advisory Letter" from the Ministry of Defence, previously sent to the Press and to approximately 400 specially selected industrial firms engaged on work connected with defence, has now been issued to all firms (about 4,000) at present so engaged, or likely to be in the event of an emergency or war.
- (b) A circular letter previously sent by Air Ministry to all civil aircraft operators has been re-issued, with the scope of the letter widened to take into account the increased security measures achieved by the re-issue of the "Advisory Letter".
- (c) A circular letter has been issued by Air Ministry to all light aero clubs, requesting them to ensure that their members co-operate, as regards aerial photography.
- (d) Advertising agents, building contractors and trade associations have been approached, in the sense of the advisory letter.

During the period under review the Defence Transition Committee has reviewed the gradings in the lists of existing Key Points and

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added to those lists. The Committee has set up a Working Party to review the security of maps, charts, plans, air photographic mosaics and air photos. Also, during the period under review a Key Points Working Party was formed, whose task was to formulate plans for the provision of anti-sabotage guards for key points in an emergency or war.

Security of Economic and Industrial Information

The Chiefs of Staff Committee has directed, since the last Tripartite Security Working Group meeting, that a Working Party be formed to consider the security measures required to safeguard information about munitions production. That Working Party's report has now been adopted as a policy to be implemented by the Service and Supply Departments concerned.

C. FRANCE

Organization of Security

1. Responsibility of the Government.

The importance of security is such that it is handled at the level of the President of the Council of Ministers. General directives concerning security originate from the Presidency of the Council (SGPDN: i.e., Permanent Secretariat for National Defense).

The Government, fully aware of the interallied nature of secret information, has decided that acts committed against any NATO country are punishable under the sections of the Penal Code dealing with crimes and offenses committed against the international security of the State.

2. Common Standards.

General regulations were established by an Inter-Ministerial General Directive on the safeguarding of classified information, dated May 19, 1952, signed by the President of the Council of Ministers.

3. Necessity for Inter-Ministerial Coordination on Security.

This necessity has been recognized. It was put into practice by a January 3, 1952, decree creating an inter-ministerial Permanent Commission for Security. (This decree was signed by the President of the Council, the Vice-President of the Council, the Minister of National Defense, and the Secretary of the Presidency of the Council.)

Among

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Among the functions of this permanent Ministerial Commission are those mentioned in the corresponding paragraph of the 1951 Tripartite Report.

4. Coordination of Security Information.

This coordination is ensured within the framework of the Inter-Ministerial Commission, and it is implemented through close teamwork between the Security Service of the Armed Forces, the Gendarmerie, the Sureté Nationale, and the Counter-Espionage Service (SDECE).

5. Departmental Security Officers

A decree of January 3, 1952, orders the appointment in each Ministry of a Security Officer or of a high-ranking officer responsible for security.

6. Security Regulations.

By a decree of January 3, 1952, the Permanent Inter-Ministerial Security Commission issued an Inter-Ministerial Directive establishing general rules concerning the safeguarding of classified information. It is also responsible for assuring the implementation of this Directive. This Directive (Inter-Ministerial General Instruction on the safeguarding of classified information, dated May 19, 1952) states that each Ministry must prepare instructions especially adapted to its services, according to the general regulations set by the Inter-Ministerial General Directive. The same decree provides, as stated above, that in each Ministry a responsible security representative must be designated to be responsible for the strict observance of security regulations within his Ministry.

(Note: Under the title "Industrial Security", reference is made to an instruction dated September 10, 1952, relating to private enterprises working for National Defense, which has also been prepared and published by the Permanent Inter-Ministerial Security Commission.)

Personnel Security

1. "Need to Know"

This principle is referred to in Chapter III of the General Inter-Ministerial Instruction on the safeguarding of classified

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information of May 19, 1952,

2. Screening of Personnel

The principles for the selection of personnel qualified to handle classified documents and material are also referred to in the same chapter of the General Inter-Ministerial Instruction. The criteria for the selection of such personnel are those set forth in the corresponding paragraph of the 1951 Report.

The Security Service of the Armed Forces (SSFA) is responsible for the control of all civil and military personnel in any way connected with the Ministry of National Defense and the Army, Navy, and Air Force Secretariats. It equally ensures the control of personnel in nationalized and private industry working for the National Defense.

The civilian Ministries, in compliance with the regulations to come into effect, must supply the Permanent Secretariat for National Defense (SGPDN, which is part of the Presidency of the Council) with lists of all persons authorized to handle documents and material classified as National Defense secrets in accordance with the definitions of the Penal Code. The SGPDN will then request the SSFA to conduct the necessary investigations.

3. Responsibility for Personnel Clearances

In accordance with Chapter III of the Inter-Ministerial General Instruction of May 19, 1952, such responsibility is that of the Ministry concerned.

(Note: In the case of private concerns working for National Defense, the clearance of personnel shall be effected by the SSFA. If the contractor disregards the recommendations of the SSFA, the contract may be cancelled without the payment of an indemnity. (See Instruction on the safeguarding of classified material in private concerns working for National Defense, dated September 10, 1952.))

4. Removal of Personnel

Persons not qualified for the handling of classified material and documents are transferred to a post where they will not be a security risk, or, when possible, their employment is terminated.

This regulation was referred to in Circular Instruction 261, dated January 3, 1952, sent by the President of the Council to all

Ministers

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Ministers and Secretaries of State,

5. Records of Personnel Clearances

Officers authorized to handle classified documents and material are designated by name by the Ministers concerned (Chapter III of General Inter-Ministerial Regulation, May 19, 1952).

(Note: In the civilian establishments working for National Defense, the Security Service of the Armed Forces is furnished with the list of personnel who may have to work in (or enter into) premises reserved for secret work, or who have the knowledge of such work and are taking part therein. (Chapter II of Regulation on the Protection of Secrecy in Civilian Establishments working for National Defense, September 10, 1952.))

6. Security ^{Training} Investigation of Personnel

Under the terms of the General Inter-Ministerial Regulation of May 19, 1952 (Chapter III, Paragraph 7), the training of such personnel in the Ministries as have access to classified matter must be effected, in each Ministry, by the Security Officer. In the case of military units, the Security Officer is responsible for the training of all the personnel as far as security is concerned.

7. Duty of Security Agencies

The Security Service of the Armed Forces and the Sûreté call to the attention of the proper authorities all derogatory information concerning personnel authorized access to secret documents.

8. Supervision of Staff

General Inter-Ministerial Regulation of May 19, 1952, did not explicitly specify the obligation for Chiefs of Sections to watch their personnel in order to detect changes in attitude which would endanger security, as such duties are among the normal responsibilities of Chiefs of Sections.

Physical Security

- 1. General Considerations)
- 2. Necessity for and Procedure)
- in Secrecy Protection) All these points are
- 3. Transmittal of secret) ruled by General Inter-
- documents) Ministerial Regulation on

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- 4. Filing of secret documents)
- 5. Destruction of secret documents)
- 6. Daily inspection of offices)
- 7. Security of buildings)
- 8. Control of visitors)
- 9. Specially sensitive points)

Secrecy Protection,
of 19 May 1952, in
the spirit of Report
1951 of the Tripartite
Committee.

Special steps are taken for the protection of specially sensitive points. Responsibility rests with the chiefs or directors of the establishments, assisted by SSFA.

10. Relations with the press

All the Ministries have a Press and Information Bureau, which is the sole agency to which members of the press should apply for information.

Industrial Security

- 1. Outline)
- 2. General Ruling)
- 3. Habilitation of firms)
- 4. Security of secret contracts)
- 5. Seclusion of premises containing secret material)
- 6. Regulations on Security)
- 7. Sub-Contractors)

The Permanent Inter-Ministerial Committee for Security has issued "Regulations on the Protection of Secrets in the civilian establishments working for National Defense", of 10 September 1952, signed by the Vice President of the Council, Minister of National Defense. To the Regulations is appended an implementation circular from the Minister of National Defense, also dated 10 September 1952 (The text of the circular

is attached

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) is attached to the Regulations).

) The points concerned under 1 to

) 7 inclusive are covered by the

) Regulations and Circular, in the

) spirit of Report 1951 of the

) Tripartite Committee.

) However, the security measures

) provided for under 3 (Habilitation

) of firms) before placing the

) contract are contained in the

) general procedure for granting

) contracts.

8. Sabotage

The detection of possible "saboteurs" is conducted in close liaison by SSFA and National Security.

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Part IV

REVIEW OF PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS
OF THE TRIPARTITE REPORT OF JUNE 4, 1951.

General Considerations.

The Tripartite Security Working Group has reviewed the agreed Principles and Standards of the Report and re-affirms its view that they provide the essential framework for security within the three governments.

The Group, in recognising that the Standards heretofore approved constitute minimum Standards only, believes that such standards should be reviewed periodically, particularly in the light of national and international conditions which might require more intensive measures for the protection of classified matter.

The review of the agreed Standards, following the recent Security presentations of the three governments has resulted in a number of suggestions for modification. These modifications would be designed either to clarify or to strengthen particular standards. In addition, certain new standards have been proposed. After careful consideration it was agreed that changes in the Standards should not be presented to the three governments for formal approval at this time. In arriving at this decision the Group took into account the fact that certain programs, undertaken in implementation of the 1951 Report, had only recently been instituted in the three governments and further time would be required in order to evaluate properly these programs. Under these circumstances the Group is submitting the following proposals affecting the Standards for consideration within each government with a view to determining whether they should be adopted. It is contemplated that these proposals will be given further consideration at the next Tripartite meeting. The paragraphs of Part IV of the Report of June 4, 1951, which are affected by the proposals for amendment are set forth below, with the deletions lined out and the additions underscored (*).

(*) Titles to each section are underscored as in the 1951 Report.

Amendments to titles are shown by double underscoring.

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THE THREE DELEGATIONS :

CONSCIOUS of the existing dangers of espionage, sabotage and subversive activities,

DESIROUS of putting into force an efficient system of security against these dangers,

DEEMING that this efficiency should be comparable in all the countries in order to assure the protection of the secrets in common,

ARE AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES :

The measures of security adopted in each country must

- (1) Extend to all persons having access to classified matter and to all premises containing classified matter (*).
- (2) Through regulation or other means, be designed to detect persons whose employment would be harmful to the security of classified matter and provide for their debarment or removal.
- (3) Prevent any unauthorised person from having access to classified matter.
- (4) Be based on the principle of "need to know" which is fundamental to all aspects of security.

IV. A. ORGANIZATION OF SECURITY.

2. Common Standards. Common standards of security measures should be observed by all Departments in each country so that classified matter can be passed from one department to another in the confidence that it will be handled with equal care. Such standards should include criteria for personnel screening practices and the protection of classified matter.

3. Necessity for Inter-Departmental Co-ordination on Security.

In order to achieve government wide standards of security measures, it is essential that there should be established a system of inter-departmental co-ordination on a high level, supported by permanent working committees on lower levels. Such a system should provide for the representation of such departments of the Government as handle classified matter. It should be one

- (*) As used herein classified matter pertains to information, oral, visual, or documentary, and material in any form or nature which in the interest of national defense must be safeguarded in the manner and to the extent required by its importance.

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of the duties of such an Inter-Departmental Committee to assist the departments in framing their security instructions on principles uniform throughout the Government: Governmental arrangements should provide for the integration and co-ordination of all policies and procedures affecting internal security.

4. Co-ordination of Security Information. All information and records on subversion and espionage in each government should be so centralised or organized that they can readily be applied to any question related to the employment of persons in government or to protection of classified matter. In addition, the fact of disqualification of any individual for access to classified matter should be readily available to any Government department concerned.

B. PERSONNEL SECURITY.

(2) Screening of Personnel. All persons, civilian and service, whose duties require access to classified matter higher than RESTRICTED should be cleared before receiving such matter. This clearance should be based on an investigation conducted by a qualified national investigative agency or other enquiry designed to determine whether such individuals are of :

(a) Unquestionable loyalty.

(b) Excellent character and of such habits, associates and discretion as to cast no doubt upon their trustworthiness in the handling of classified matter. Particularly close scrutiny in screening procedures should be given to : (1) persons to have access to matter classified TOP SECRET; (2) any persons who are of Russian or Satellite origin or connection; and (3) any other persons who may be vulnerable to pressure from foreign sources. In this connection the fullest practicable use should be made of the technique of background investigation.

(4) Removal of Personnel. Substitute text : Persons who are considered to be security risks such as those who are members of Communist, Fascist or other subversive or anti-national organizations or those concerning whose loyalty or trustworthiness there is reasonable doubt should be barred or removed from positions where they might have access to classified matter.

/5. Records...

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(5) Records of Personnel Clearances. All government establishments handling classified matter should maintain a record of the clearances granted to the personnel assigned thereto in order to determine which persons may be given access to classified matter; Furthermore, dossiers of all persons previously cleared should be re-examined periodically to determine whether the clearance conforms with current security standards and appropriate action taken.

(6) Security Instruction of Personnel. All personnel employed in positions where they might have access to classified matter should be thoroughly and periodically instructed in the need for security and the procedures for accomplishing it. All such personnel should certify that they fully understand the security regulations relevant to their employment.

(7) Duty of Security Agencies. It should be the duty of security agencies when a person comes to adverse notice relating to subversive activity or trustworthiness which might justify some action being taken concerning his employment, to discover whether such person is or has been employed in government or industry on classified work. If so, the authority concerned should be informed. This requirement applies equally to any person, not being a government employee, who has served in a consultative capacity on secret work.

(8) Supervision of Staff. Supervising officials should have the duty of observing the attitudes and habits of employees all personnel who are engaged on CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET and TOP SECRET work. in which case supervisors should endeavour to detect any change in the attitude of a-subordinate such personnel which may indicate the need for consulting the security authorities or taking other action concerning the employment of such persons.

C. PHYSICAL SECURITY. (INFORMATION AND MATERIAL).

(2) Need for Protection. All classified matter is of value to enemies of the three governments and should therefore require protection to prevent its receipt by unauthorized persons. Official matter should be continually examined, and if protection is required, should be graded in accordance with the degree of protection necessary. Within each government there should exist uniform practices for all departments regarding the classification, including downgrading and declassification, custody, transmission and disposal of all classified matter.

(6) Daily Inspection. All persons holding or otherwise having custody of classified matter should make an daily inspection upon each departure to ensure

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that all such material under their control is securely stored and that all locking devices are secure. Further independent inspections should be carried out after working hours.

(7) Building Security. Buildings which house activities dealing with classified matter should be so protected as to ~~deny access to unauthorized personnel~~ prevent unauthorized access to such matter. Such protective measures should include barring of windows, locks for doors, guards at entrances, security inspections, ~~and~~ night guard patrols within the buildings, and police dogs.

D. INDUSTRIAL SECURITY.

(1) Definition. Industrial security applies to the security protection of classified matter entrusted to industries, laboratories, schools, universities and other privately-owned or managed installations not under the jurisdiction of the government (*). In addition, it applies to measures taken to protect materials and installations against the possibilities of sabotage (**)

(2) General Concept. Classified matter entrusted to private installations should be subjected to equivalent security protection, physical and personnel, as required within the government.

The security problem in industry differs in many respects from that in government departments, because the secret material which it is desired to safeguard in a factory goes through various stages of design and manufacture entailing a wide degree of flexibility in security procedures. For this reason too great reliance should not be placed on overall screening and classification. The principles, therefore, of concentrating security resources on the more vital aspects of a project and limiting a knowledge of these vital aspects to as few persons as possible should be strictly applied.

In order to recognize the importance in industry of these principles, the following are pre-requisites for each project :

/(1) An....

(*) Establishments under the jurisdiction of the Defense Departments are regarded as coming within the scope of Sections B and C.

(**) For the purposes of these Standards, sabotage is regarded as any act, falling short of a military operation, or an omission, intended to cause physical damage and to assist a foreign power or to further a subversive aim, or any wilful act causing physical damage of importance to the national defense.

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- (1) An appreciation of what a potential enemy particularly needs to find out.
- (2) A clear emphasis by the Military Services or Staffs of the operational importance of particular enterprises and projects.
- (3) Direction to the responsible security authorities as to the vital secrets on which security precautions should be focussed at the earliest stages of the conception of the requirement.
- (4) Application of the correct classification at all stages.

(8) Sabotage. Physical security precautions for the protection of vital key points is the best possible safeguard against sabotage and screening alone can be no effective substitute. There should be a thorough knowledge of all potential saboteurs, so that in any emergency action can be taken against them without delay to render them harmless.

(9) Protection of Information on Key Points. The distribution of industrial information of military significance, which might be translated into bombing or sabotage targets, should be controlled by means of a policy which hampers the compilation by potential enemies of a Key Points List. It may be expedient for this to be achieved by co-operation rather than legislation. Those concerned in the implementation of such a policy include industry, Government Departments - including Civil Defense, the press, civil aircraft operators and light aero clubs, advertising agencies, building contractors' trade associations, insurance agencies, and compilers of maps, charts, plans and air photographic mosaics.

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PART V

COMMENTARY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS IN THE THREE COUNTRIES

Introduction and Concept

This Report has described the 1952 Tripartite meetings held in the three countries and the steps taken in each country to date to implement the Principles and Standards. It is believed that these taken together with the account of the three security systems as set forth in Appendices A, B, and C of the Basic Report of June 4, 1951, provide an adequate factual description of the security systems of the three Governments as they exist at the present time.

As stated in Part I of the Basic Report of June 4, 1951, the objectives of the work of the Tripartite Group are "to arrive at a close coordination in the security field, to promote mutual confidence in security measures, and thus to facilitate the exchange of information on all matters". Obviously, mutual confidence in security must stem from a willingness to discuss any and every aspect of the security practices of the three countries. Such willingness and complete frankness has characterized both the 1951 and 1952 meetings of the Group. Strong points and deficiencies alike in each country's system have been the subject of free discussion.

The purpose of this part of the Report is to incorporate opinions generally held by the Delegations on such strong points and deficiencies, particularly with respect to the method and adequacy of implementation of the Principles and Standards in the three countries. It is recognized that one of the common errors in undertaking a critique of a governmental system of another country is a tendency to transplant the features of one's own system in the system of the other, ignoring historical, political, geographical and sociological problems which may be unique in the latter. Consequently, every effort has been made to guard against this tendency in the drafting of this commentary and to comment only from the standpoint of the comparable effectiveness of the security systems.

The questions raised herein regarding the sufficiency of the

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security systems involve a commitment by each Delegation to re-examine the question raised and discuss it at the next Tripartite meeting. The mutual confidence desired in the security field will be improved to the extent that questions raised are resolved by a positive showing that there is no sufficient basis for the criticism or that steps have been taken to improve security in the matter in question.

COMMENTARY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
 TRIPARTITE REPORT BY THE UNITED STATES

Prepared by

the French and the United Kingdom Representatives

1. We are left with the impression that relations with the press are inadequately controlled with respect to classified matter.
2. In buildings open to the public there should exist a larger number of restricted areas for the protection of classified matter.
3. The overall security system—particularly personnel screening—appears to be too comprehensive. This tendency, if not watched, might result in important matters not being given the degree of attention deserved.

There is doubt that in the Department of Defense there exists uniform execution of security policies in the various security agencies. Creation of a single security agency in the Department of Defense would assure such uniformity, as well as result in greater efficiency.

4. Public Law No. 414: United States Immigration and Nationality Act, 1952

British Commentary

While recognizing that this Law or certain sections of it have been drawn up as a security measure for the protection of the United States, the United Kingdom representatives consider that apart from the economic consequences to British shipping that may result when this Law becomes effective, certain factors affecting security are involved.

The section of Public Law No. 414 dealing with passport and visa requirements

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requirements for foreign merchant seamen presents serious practical difficulties, details of which have been given to the United States Government. The U.K. representatives are doubtful, from a security standpoint, even if the application of this Law extended over a period of years, whether the value to be gained outweighs the serious practical difficulties involved. Further, they consider that whatever may be accomplished would be achieved at far too high a cost in the shape of slowing down and otherwise penalizing extremely essential shipping activities.

In addition, the United Kingdom representatives are of the opinion that there may be a real danger of the loss or irregular disposal of seamen's identity documents. The revised form of the document which is envisaged in order to comply with the new Law would be of greater value to an unauthorized holder than the present one held by merchant seamen, in that it could be accepted as conclusive evidence of a national status which he did not possess. The same arguments apply with equal force in regard to seamen's visas, which would be exposed to the same risk of falling into wrong hands.

French Commentary

Although the subject of this law in its entirety is not within the province of the French Delegation to criticize, in addition to which they are not fully apprised of all the details of the law, it seems that its introduction might have security repercussions in France, such as adverse effect on the morale of seamen.

COMMENTARY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRIPARTITE REPORT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM

Prepared by

the French and the United States Representatives

A. Organization for Security

1. Common Standards

a. While the British Government has distributed a "Handbook on Security" which covers the classification, transmission and handling of official information, there appears to be a lack of centralized

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review of the respective ministerial regulations. Consequently there is no positive assurance that there are common standards of implementation of the Handbook on Security.

b. There is no common written standard for selecting cases which require a full field investigation. Furthermore, there is no common written standard for determining the scope of full field investigations.

c. There are no common standards in the form of written criteria for use by the ministries for determining security risks other than subversives.

2. Inter-Departmental Coordination on Security

a. While there are committees engaged in the internal security field, we are not aware of any overall coordinating committees to provide for the integration and coordination of all policies and procedures affecting investigations and other internal security matters.

B. Personnel Security

1. Too much reliance is placed on screening techniques that consist primarily of checking names against Security Service files and examination of departmental records in cases where this procedure results in no adverse information. Conversely, there has been insufficient recognition of the far-reaching value of background investigations.

2. Normal vetting is applied to all persons having access to classified matter higher than RESTRICTED. In order to provide greater protection to classified matter, normal vetting should be applied to all civilians who are either applicants or Government employees. Personal service contract employees should also be vetted if they have access to areas where classified matter is kept.

3. a. Positive vetting is confined to relatively few positions, but should be extended to all persons having access to TOP SECRET information, except in instances involving well-known officials. It is the view of the French and the United States representatives that there are insufficient field investigations to achieve the best security.

b. The security questionnaire used in positive vetting does not contain sufficient information for best results. The questionnaire should

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should provide for a listing of other names which have been used by the individual and of his close relatives. It should be subscribed to under oath. (U.S. Comment)

c. The British system lacks the advantage of a centralized fingerprint identification system for use in security work. (U.S. Comment)

4. There are no uniform practices throughout the Government for barring or removing from employment persons who are security risks for reasons other than subversion, such as character instability.

C. Physical Security

1. It is the belief of the French and the United States representatives that the British physical security conforms generally with the Principles and Standards. However, there is a lack of modern protection equipment.

D. Industrial Security

On the basis of the information presented and the tours taken in British industrial plants, there appears to be a sound realistic approach to security by industry and Government. Of particular significance is the apparent attitude of industry in cooperating with the Government in carrying out suggested security measures. Physical protection is satisfactory and governmental requirements through personal contact are apparently followed as closely as possible in order to protect classified matter.

There seems to be, however, a lack of written directives which would ensure uniform minimum standards in the physical aspects of industrial security.

The comments made in Section B (Personnel Security), paragraphs one and three, are applicable to industrial security.

COMMENTARY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRIPARTITE REPORT BY THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT

Prepared by

the United Kingdom and the United States Representatives

A. Organization for Security

1. While the authority of the Inter-Ministerial Commission is

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sufficiently broad to include all phases of internal security, studies have been undertaken only in a limited number of fields at the present time.

2. While the several investigative and information collection agencies have amassed important data relating to internal security, there does not appear to be sufficiently closely coordinated effort to obtain and utilize this information to the greatest advantage. It is suggested that in the interest of security generally all information relating to subversive activities and persons should be centralized.

3. It is suggested that for more effective utilization of the security agencies, they should dovetail more closely in inter-departmental affairs.

B. Personnel Security (Governmental and Industrial)

1. The French system lacks the advantages of a centralized fingerprint identification system for use in security work. (U.S. Comment)

2. Although there is no legal basis for barring or removing Communists, Communist sympathizers, fascists, and other subversive elements from positions where they have access to classified matter, it is understood that proposed legislation may correct these deficiencies.

3. It appears that the new security program as it applies to civil departments has still to be implemented.

4. There is doubt that standards utilized by the SSFA in barring Communists, Communist sympathizers, fascists, subversive elements, and other security risks are applied uniformly throughout the French Government by the Ministries involved. (U.S. Comment)

C. Physical Security (Governmental and Industrial)

The French physical security system appears to conform generally with the standards set forth in the Tripartite Report on this subject. It is understood, however, that there is still a deficiency in protection equipment.

D. General Observation

The United Kingdom and United States representatives are of the opinion that the French Security authorities have made considerable progress in most fields in implementing the standards set forth in the Tripartite Report on this subject.

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PART VI.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

The three Delegations have agreed to recommend that their respective Governments : -

- A. Give prompt consideration to the proposed changes set forth in Part IV of this Report affecting the Principles and Standards of the Report of June 4, 1951;
- B. Consider the criticisms by the other Delegations and the practicability of removing the basis for such criticism;
- C. Instruct their representatives on the Standing Group of N.A.T.O. to study the feasibility of obtaining the acceptance by other N.A.T.O. countries of the agreed Principles and Standards of Security and to take appropriate action pursuant to the results of such study.
[At such time as other N.A.T.O. countries accept these Principles and Standards, close working relationships should be established between the liaison officers representing the three Delegations (see note to paragraph D below) and the representatives of the three countries on N.A.T.O. committees dealing with security matters];
- D. Agree to reconvening the Tripartite Security Working Group not later than October 1, 1953, for the purpose of :
 1. Observing further progress in the implementation of the accepted Principles and Standards,
 2. Considering and taking action with respect to the proposals for amendment of such Principles and Standards as set forth in Part IV of this Report.
 3. Giving further consideration to the criticisms of the three security systems as set forth in Part V

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of this Report.

4. Studying other problems in the internal security field.

(Note: The Tripartite Group has established a permanent liaison between the three Delegations to provide for co-ordination of problems of mutual interest that may arise between meetings of the Group).

APPROVED ON BEHALF OF THE THREE DELEGATIONS :

S.D. BOYKIN
Chairman, United States Delegation.

Capitaine de Frégate A.L.E. GUILLERME.
Chairman, French Delegation.

G.A. CAREY FOSTER.
Chairman, United Kingdom Delegation.

Paris.
8 December 1952.

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APPENDIX A

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(UNITED STATES)

TRIPARTITE SECURITY WORKING GROUP

Program of the United States

October 27-31, 1952

Monday, October 27

U.S. Army	Introductory talk by General Omar Bradley
Department of State	Program Outline and Objectives of Meetings Mr. S.D. Boykin, U.S. Chairman Response and Discussion of Objectives
National Security Council	"Security Practices and Preservation of Democratic and Constitutional Government" Mr. Ray Whearty, Inter-Departmental Committee on Internal Security "United States Government Organization for Security" Col. Sidney S. Rubenstein, Office of the Secretary of Defense "Requirements for the Classification and Handling of Security Information (E.O. 10290)" Mr. Pat Coyne, National Security Council Representative on Internal Security

Tuesday, October 28

Department of the Army	"Security and Loyalty Practices in Government Agencies (Uniform Regulations for Security)" A. Screening Requirements for Applicants and Appointees for Federal Employment (E.O. 9835 and E.O. 10241) B. Security and Loyalty Screening Requirements Affecting Incumbents (E.O. 9835 and E.O. 10241) C. Suspension and Removal Procedures under Existing Statutes and Executive Orders (Mr. Leon L. Wheelless, Office of the Secretary of Defense) D. Military Personnel Loyalty and Security Programs
Department of the Navy	"Protection of Installations" A. Evaluation and Protection of Important Non-Government Installations B. Fort and Ship Security

Visit to Fourth District, Office of Special Investigations,
Department of the Air Force, Bolling Air Force Base

Wednesday, October 29

Federal Bureau of Investigation	"Investigative Techniques Used in Back- ground and Loyalty Checks in the U.S. Government" Inspector L.L. Laughlin, F.B.I.
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Correlation

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(Federal Bureau
of Investigation)

"Correlation and Utilization of
Security Data" (Inspection of File
System)
Mr. A.H. Belmont, Assistant Director,
F.B.I.

Showing of film, "A Day at the F.B.I"

Tour of Laboratory of F.B.I.

Thursday, October 30

Visit to Bendix Aircraft plant, Towson, Maryland.

Visit to Glenn L. Martin plant, Middle River, Maryland.

Friday, October 31

Department of State

"Physical Security in Government
Buildings" (with film showing)

Federal Bureau of
Investigation

"The Threat of Communism in the
United States"
Mr. W.C. Sullivan, F.B.I.

Department of State

"Summary of United States Security
Practices and the Tripartite
Report of June 4, 1951"
Mr. S.D. Boykin, U.S. Chairman

Special Talk on Press Relations,
Col. Joseph Edgerton, U.S.A.F.

Panel Forum

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APPENDIX B

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(UNITED KINGDOM)

TRIPARTITE SECURITY WORKING GROUP

Program of the United Kingdom

November 12-18, 1952

Wednesday, November 12

Ministry of Defence	Introductory talk by Sir Norman Brook
Treasury	"Personnel Security: Principles and Standards followed in the U.K." Mr. Clough
Inter-Departmental Committee on Security	"General Principles of Security and Physical Security" Mr. Hewison, Secretary
Visit to War Room, Ministry of Defence	
Security film flashes	

Thursday, November 13

War Office	Introductory talk by Director of Establishments
	Questions on War Office application of Personnel Security rules (Civil and Military).
	Physical Security
	Inspection of Registry
Foreign Office	Introductory talk by Mr. D.P. Reilly.
	"The Work of the Foreign Office Security Department", including: Departmental duties; Review of measures taken to strengthen security during the past year; Personnel security. Mr. Carey Foster
Security Service	Talk by Mr. D.G. White, Director, Intelligence and Investigation Division, on the Security Service

Friday, November 14

Visit to Royal Air Force, Benson	
	Reception by Group Captain L.J. Stickley: "The Role of R.A.F. Benson"
	Introductory statement by Group Captain Mears, D.D.I.(S), Air Ministry

Demonstration

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Demonstration of R.A.F. Station Security. Squadron Leader Holloway, Station Intelligence Officer Benson

Introductory statement by Wing Commander Parry, P.M.1, Air Ministry, to demonstration of police dogs by Flight Lt. Smith.

Saturday, November 15

"The Security of Economic and Industrial Information" - Mr. E.M.Furnival Jones.

Meeting to consider progress made by the U.K. in implementing the recommendations of the Tripartite Security Report.

Monday, November 17

Visit to Gloster Aircraft Company (G.A.C.), Gloucester

Introductory talk by Director of G.A.C.

G.A.C. officials discuss Security Instructions

Tour of factory

Tuesday, November 18

Visit to Bristol Aircraft Company (B.A.C.), Bristol

Introductory talk by Mr. W.R. Verden Smith, Joint Assisting Managing Director

Tour of Bristol Aircraft and Engine Division

Survey by B.A.C. officials of the Security Organisation embracing main aspects of physical security.

Survey by B.A.C. officials of special security problems in connection with secret weapons; followed by discussion and questions.

Film.

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APPENDIX C

(FRANCE)

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TRIPARTITE SECURITY WORKING GROUP

Program of France

November 21-28, 1952

Friday, November 21Permanent Secretariat
for National Defense
(S.G.P.D.N.)Introductory talk by M. Mons, Secretary
General of National DefenseReport on the protection of secrecy at
French Government levels (Inter-Minister-
ial Commission of Security)Security Service
of the Armed Forces
(S.S.F.A.)

Educational films

Monday, November 24Security Service
of the Armed Forces

Report on Personnel Security

Report on Security of Documents and
Instructions on Security and Counter-
Espionage

Visit to Onera

Tuesday, November 25

National Security

Report of the National Security;
General Information

Preservation of secret material

Visit to the National Security

Wednesday, November 26Ministry of
External AffairsReport on organization of security
at the Ministry of External Affairs

Report on Communism in France

Visit to Bretigny Test Flight Field

Thursday, November 27

Visit to D.E.F.A. at St. Cloud

Visit to Hispano Suisa factory

Friday, November 28Security Service
of the Armed Forces

Report on Industrial Security

Meeting on the French program and organi-
zation of work for drafting of Tripartite
Report.~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~APPENDIX D.COMPOSITION OF WORKING GROUP.UNITED STATES.

	Mr. S.D. BOYKIN, (Chairman),	Department of State.
		Central Intelligence Agency.
OGA	Mr. J.C. ELLIOTT	Department of State.
	Mr. Victor KEAY	Federal Bureau of Investigation.
	Mr. Arthur G. PATTON	Department of the Navy.
	Colonel DOYLE REES	Department of the Air Force.
	Colonel Sidney S. RUBINSTEIN	Office of Secretary of Defense.
	Colonel John F. SCHMELZER	Department of the Army.


UNITED KINGDOM.

	Mr. G.A. CAREY FOSTER (Chairman)	Foreign Office.
	Group Captain C.V. MEARS	Air Ministry.
	Mr. R.H. OWEN	British Embassy, Paris.
	Air Commodore N.S. PAYNTER	Security Service.
	Major H.C.M. STONE	Security Service.


FRANCE.

	Capitaine de Frégate A.L.E. GUILLERME (Chairman),	Permanent Secretariat for National Defense.
	Colonel André BONNEFOUS	Security Service of the Armed Forces.
	M. Max MOULINS	Renseignements Généraux.


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



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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605


























































EO 3.3(h)(2)
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EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605



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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605


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
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


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


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





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
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
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
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



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
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




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
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
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
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
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
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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605




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
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
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
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
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


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
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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605



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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605



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


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EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

EO 3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605



EO 3.3(h)(2)
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EO 3.3(h)(2)
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